The North Sea is no longer only a logistics corridor or an energy hub. It has become a vulnerable junction where physical and digital threats collide. Eduard de van der Schueren is Program Director of the Protection of North Sea Infrastructure program. He is seconded from the Dutch Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, which took on the coordinating role three years ago. “It’s an interdepartmental program where six ministries work together.” His background is naval aviation, and over the last ten years he has worked within the Air Force. “I flew for the Navy, so to speak.”
That multi-domain background fits the challenge perfectly, because the threat landscape itself is multi-domain by nature.
Threats at sea are more than a dragging anchor
When people think about threats in the North Sea, they often picture ships dragging anchors across the seabed and cutting cables. Eduard acknowledges that scenario, then immediately widens the frame. “That is one form of threat. But we are now seeing more threats. The picture has become broader and more complex: vessels launching drones, flying drones that move over land, and potentially underwater drones as well. Add disruption of crucial navigation and communications systems. Maybe we will soon see ships that disrupt our 5G network or our GPS network. That is the physical threat.”
On top of that sits the digital threat, which is just as real. But Eduard describes the overall risk as an accumulation of factors: an adversary’s willingness to act, their capability to act, and our own vulnerabilities and dependencies. “That total makes the North Sea a strategic target right now.”
Within the program, the focus is broader than offshore wind. “It is more than only energy. We also talk about oil, gas and electricity. Electricity is a major element, especially given the Dutch ambition to source a large share of national energy demand from the North Sea. The Cabinet’s ambition was to get 75% of the Netherlands’ energy needs from the North Sea by 2030.” But at least as important is the undersea digital backbone that keeps Europe connected. Eduard says: “Everyone thinks everything is mobile these days. But that is only a small part. The rest really runs through cables. Those subsea cables connect the Netherlands to other European countries and far beyond. Via the Baltic Sea or via the Mediterranean Sea and other countries within Europe. And through the Channel there is a large volume of cables connecting us to the Far East.”
In short: disruption in the North Sea rarely stays contained within one sector. It hits multiple foundations at once.
Collaboration is essential, but the playing field is complex
Protecting this infrastructure requires cooperation across multiple layers. Eduard starts with the public sector itself: responsibilities are distributed, so alignment is critical. Then there is the broad field of private organisations: parties that own cables, use cables, maintain cables, or operate pipelines. “That is quite a broad playing field.”
His programme focuses on the North Sea, while recognising the obvious reality that everything continues onshore. “Those cables come ashore somewhere and then continue.”
“I think we are still very vulnerable in our awareness of how vulnerable we are.”
He still sees a familiar reflex: what does it cost, who pays, what does it mean for the business case? And that is where he wants the conversation to shift. “You cannot only look to the government. You really have to look to all of us. We all have a stake. Not as a voluntary “contribution”, but as a shared responsibility. We are all part of that national security.”
Hybrid threats are more realistic than tanks, and they show up in every domain
Eduard does not expect the next conflict to necessarily look like a classic invasion. “I don’t think a war we might face will mean bombs and grenades falling on the Netherlands, or Russian tanks driving in.” What he does see as far more realistic is hybrid threat activity: sabotage and disinformation below the threshold of open conflict. “That is much more realistic, and the threat is growing. The chance of it happening is becoming real. That is a characteristic of hybrid threats.” He describes them as covert operations by state actors that use non-state elements: bribed individuals, plausible-deniability ‘incidents’, and actions that sit in the grey zone.
As a result, the line between state and non-state activity blurs: organised crime, activism, extremism, and state influence begin to overlap. “You no longer know whether it is a country behind it, or simply a ‘dumb captain’ who did something strange.”
What strategic choices should leaders in the energy and infrastructure ecosystem make right now? “Not so much: how can I contribute, because then it sounds like you need a return on investment. But what is my role in that national security and how can I contribute? That requires a different posture: proactive rather than reactive. Think: what could happen? How can I prepare for it? Instead of waiting until something happens and then figuring out how to solve it.” He stresses the chain principle:
“A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Everyone is part of the system. Everyone is a brick in that house. You are not just a little lantern we hang up to decorate it.”
Five lines of effort and a structural ambition: a National Maritime Security Center
The Protection of North Sea Infrastructure program has been running for three years and works along five lines of effort: governance, situational awareness, resilience, crisis management, and cooperation. “We believe that if you address all five properly, you improve protection across the board. But there is a tension around continuity. We are doing it with incidental funding and a temporary program team.” Eduard hopes it will be embedded structurally and points to a clear ambition: “We aim to establish a National Maritime Security Center that bundles all these initiatives and sees the coherence.”
Why this matters to Sentyron, and what Eduard hopes people take away
For Sentyron, this is not only a maritime story. It is a clear example of how critical infrastructure protection is changing. The North Sea brings physical disruption, cyber operations and hybrid tactics together in one environment, and it exposes how deeply dependent we have become on systems we rarely see.
That is why Eduard’s message is ultimately about ownership. “You can’t only look to the government. You really have to look to all of us.” That is also the point he wants to underline at the Protection of Energy Systems congress (Bescherming Energiesystemen): that participants should feel part of a wider safety network, and act accordingly. Not reactive, but proactive. “Think: what could happen? How can I prepare for it? Because when infrastructure is foundational, the impact is national.”
And that is exactly why the North Sea is not just something to develop, but something to protect.